This paper addresses -with the help of numerical simulation -some of the issues relating to income distribution in the context of development of an economy with an informal sector and migration of both low and high skilled workers from the rural to the urban area. A major aim has been to see under what conditions we do or do not get an inverted U-shaped curve of income distribution. The paper finds that the tendency always is for the Gini coefficient to rise and then decline. However, once it starts declining, it need not continuously decline; it may rise, then decline, then rise again and indeed rise above the previous peak before starting to decline again and may well end at the end of the simulation at a higher value than at the start. Any case for the redistribution of income is seen to be much stronger at later stages of development that at earlier stages, even though at later stages, Gini coefficient may be lower than at earlier stages. The policy implications of the findings are briefly considered.
Introduction
We owe to the pioneer work of Kuznets (1955) the hypothesis that income inequality first rises and then falls with development, tracing out an inverted U-shaped curve.
Kuznets argued that during the early stages of development, most of the population will be in the agricultural sector, with low per capita income but low inequality, incomes in the rural area being more equally distributed than in the urban area. As people begin to migrate to the higher-income urban area, overall inequality will increase. During the later stages of development, however, this force for inequality would be more than offset by a decline in inequality within the urban area, owing to the better adaptation of the children of rural-urban migrants to city life and "growing political power of the urban lower-income groups" to enact "a variety of protective and supportive legislation" (p. 17).
The empirical validity of the Kuznets curve continues to remain in question. Part of the problem is methodological. Reliable time series data on the distribution of income, over any substantial period, are not available for most developing countries.
Two approaches have therefore usually been taken by researchers to test the inverted-U hypothesis. One is to make the heroic assumption that different countries observed at different levels of development at a given point in time chart the path that a typical country would follow over a long period of time. One then examines whether the cross country data yield an inverted-U plot of inequality against level of development, as measured by per capita income. The other approach is to examine changes in inequality within countries over the short periods for which data are available, and see whether inequality has risen in relatively less developed countries and declined in more developed countries.
The Kuznets curve has received support in cross-sectional studies by Paukert (1973) , Cline (1975) , Chenery and Syrquin (1975) , Ahluwalia (1976) and Papanek and Kyn (1986) , among others. However, the findings of the cross-sectional studies have been questioned, among others, by Anand and Kanbur (1993) who show that the results are very sensitive to the choice of data set and that one can get U relationship, inverted-U relationship or very little relationship at all by making different choices.
In a study exemplifying the second of the two approaches mentioned above, Fields (1991) has shown that "inequality increases with growth as frequently in the lowincome countries as in the high-income countries. There is no tendency for inequality to increase more in the early stages of economic development than in the later stages" (p. 45). In a subsequent study, Fields (2001) found a substantial "Latin American effect": that the Kuznets curve that is observed in many cross-sectional data could simply be a statistical fluke resulting from the fact that for specific historical reasons, most Latin American countries happen to have both a middle level of income and a high level of inequality.
There has also in recent years been the evidence of sharp rise in wage inequality in most OECD countries since the early 1970s. Growth, it has been noted, has not brought about a steady reduction in inequality. Various explanations have been offered for this observed upsurge of inequality in developed countries, with a major cause of the upsurge being attributed to a shift in the relative demands for skilled and unskilled labour. Atkinson (1996) , after reviewing the relevant evidence, concluded
that "there appears to be widespread agreement on the fact that there has been a shift in demand away from unskilled labour in favour of skilled workers", and that this provides a straightforward explanation for rising earnings dispersion. Aghion and Williamson (1998) , in particular, have emphasised the role of skill-based technological change in this context. Technological change, they argue, has been biased towards certain skills and skilled workers and hence been an important source of increasing inequality. As they write, "…technical progress stands as one important source of increasing inequality. Given that it is also the major force of economic growth, the Kuznets' hypothesis appears to be strongly challenged" (p. 81). In this view, there would be a spread of inequality in a high income region. 1 There are others, however, who continue to hold that there is still good evidence for the Kuznets curve. The difficulty, they argue, is that many other factors, in addition to the level of development, affect a country's level of inequality. Once the analysis accounts for these factors, the Kuznets curve, as it were, "comes out of hiding". Barro (2000) , in particular, has forcefully argued for this view.
Given the conflicting nature of the available empirical evidence, the scarcity of reliable time series on income inequality spanning several decades, and the multitude of factors likely to affect a country's level of inequality, the use of numerical methods would appear to be particularly appropriate here. It is, therefore, surprising that numerical methods have so rarely been employed in this area. Such methods can clearly complement both theoretical and empirical work. Numerical examples can both illustrate the important results and show how sensitive they are to changes in key parameters and initial conditions. The purpose of this paper is to use numerical methods to address some of the issues surrounding income distribution and the hypothesis of inverted-U curve. A major aim will be to highlight the key role that the informal sector plays in the evolution of income distribution. The explanations offered for the existence or non-existence of the inverted-U curve have not in general incorporated the role of the informal sector in any systematic way.
In much of the theoretical literature, following Todaro (1969) and Harris-Todaro (1970) , the informal sector is viewed as being essentially a stagnant and unproductive sector, serving merely as a refuge for the urban unemployed and as a receiving station for newly arriving rural migrants on their way to the formal sector jobs. 2 In sharp contrast, the empirical literature increasingly sees the informal sector as dynamic, efficient, contributing significantly to national output and capable of attracting and sustaining labour in its own rights. 3 Studies show that the share of the urban labour force engaged in informal sector activities is growing and now ranges from 30 per cent to 70 per cent, the average being around 50 per cent. Empirical findings also
show that many migrants from the rural to the urban area are attracted by income earning opportunities in the informal sector itself; also that there is very little job search activity by the workers in the informal sector.
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The present writer has elsewhere (Bhattacharya 1993a (Bhattacharya , 1994 (Bhattacharya , 1998b presented and analysed a three-sector general equilibrium model of a developing economy which systematically incorporates an informal sector and, in the dynamic version of the model, presented alternative migration functions to those employed in the Todaro and
Harris-Todaro-type models. I now use this model as the base for the simulation exercises to be performed here. In the simulation model, the aim, in particular, will be to consider a number of different scenarios relating to the evolution of the primary or formal sector wage and to study the implications of these for the evolution of income distribution. We shall also examine the migration effects of both low and high skilled workers from the rural to the urban area as also the effects of skill-biased technological change. We shall also briefly study the effects of changes in the natural 1 In this context, see, however, the work of Galor and Zeira (1993) . 2 For a review of this literature, see Bhattacharya (1993a) . 3 See, among others, ILO (1972) , Sethuraman (1976) , Bhattacharya (1996 Bhattacharya ( ,1998a and Gillis et al. (1992) . 4 See, for example, Bhattacharya (1993b Bhattacharya ( , 2002 . See also Williamson (1988) for a review of some of the empirical evidence. As Williamson puts it "Todaro's job-lottery and high unemployment view of urban labour markets in the Third World simply fails to pass the test of evidence".
growth rates of different population segments in the economy. The focus will be on Lorenz curves, the evolution of Gini coefficient and to see if and under what conditions we do or do not get an inverted U-shaped curve of income distribution. We shall also briefly consider the policy implications of the findings.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief outline and then sets out the final equations of the static model of the economy. Section 3 sets out the dynamic model. The simulation model and the results of the numerical solution are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes. Table 1 summarises the notation used in the paper and is provided for convenient reference.
The Static Model: the Model Outline and the Final Equations
We have the following three sectors in our economy: the rural sector (R-sector) which, as the name implies, is located in the rural area; and the formal and informal sectors (F-and I-sectors, respectively), both located in the urban area. The people in the rural sector are divided into two groups: those who own land and those who do not. We call the former the rural hirers (R H ) and the latter, the manual labourers (l m ).
A rural hirer supervises agricultural operations in the land that he owns; he "cultivates" this land by hiring landless labourers, i.e. by hiring l m . We assume that he hires this labour at a market wage and not at a conventional wage. He also uses inputs from the F-sector of the economy.
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In the urban area, the distinction between the formal and informal sectors is based on the fact that due to the existence of the Minimum Wage Act, a firm in the urban area which employs more than a specified number of workers, say l*, is required to pay a wage which is "institutionally" determined and is above the free market wage:
the formal sector in this economy then consists of all such firms. 6 The informal sector, by contrast, consists of firms which obtain labour at the free market wage. The informal sector is also characterised by ease of entry.
Within the informal sector itself, however, a distinction is made between two kinds of unit and two kinds of output that they respectively produce. First, there is the output produced by a group of I-sector workers which is directly consumed by the people in the F-sector: the services of shoe-shine boys, domestic servants, etc., are examples of this. We call this segment of the I-sector informal services (I S ) to 5 For example, fertilisers. 6 See also the discussion in the text on pp12-13 and footnote 15 below. -and F-goods; (b) the employers and the employees in the F-sector consume R-, F-and I S -goods; but that (c) the l m and the workers in the I-sector cannot, due to their low earnings, consume high-priced F-goods; and they consume only R-goods.
The economy just described has been modelled formally in Bhattacharya (1994) and only the final equations of the model are therefore set out here 7 (with Appendix I providing brief interpretations of the labour market equilibrium equations of the model for easy reference and ease of understanding):
The demand for and the supply of F-sector output is given by:
The demand for and the supply of labour in the R-sector is given by:
The demand for and the supply of R-sector output is given by:
The demand for and the supply of I M output is given by:
By the definition of δ , we have the following equilibrium condition:
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We state the conditions for labour market equilibrium in the urban area in the form of two equations:
In the formal model, the price of the F -sector output is taken as the numeraire of the system.
The endogenous variables of the model are: ; the exogenous variables are: .
Eqs. (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (7) of the model are linearly dependent and for purposes of carrying out comparative static exercises we can, therefore, drop one of the equations from consideration and reduce the system to one of six equations in six unknowns. (The unknowns are the price of the rural sector output, the wage in the rural sector, the price of the I M -sector output, the number of firms in the I M -sector, the wage in the informal sector, and employment in the formal sector.) The comparative static analysis of the model has been carried out in Bhattacharya (1994) and the interested reader is referred to that paper for a discussion of these results. 8 Migration is introduced in the dynamic version of the model and I now turn to outlining the dynamic model.
The Dynamic Model

The Model Outline and Rural-Urban Migration
Time enters in our model in three ways: through technical progress, through capital accumulation in the formal sector, and through changes in the labour force. It is assumed that technical progress occurs in the formal sector and in the rural sector, but not in the informal sector. It is further assumed, in accord with wide empirical evidence, that technical progress is labour-saving in the formal sector, but labour-using (and landaugmenting) in the rural sector. In determining investment, we accept the spirit of the capital stock adjustment model and write
is the optimal capital stock and the present capital stock.
We take the optimal capital stock as being some function of the expected profit and the current profit as being a proxy for the expected profit. We can then write:
The model, in particular, is seen to be block-recursive with changes in the rural sector, at any given time, having no effects on profit or employment creation in the urban area. The model, however, has a fundamental asymmetric feature in that while changes in the rural sector have no effects on the endogenous variables of the urban area, changes in the urban area do affect the endogenous variables of the rural sector, and these implications of the model, I have noted in Bhattacharya (1994) , are in direct contrast to the fundamental implications of the Lewis (1954) -type models which suggest that agricultural development is a pre-requisite to industrial development and that it is agriculture which must necessarily provide resources for industrialisation. The model also questions the conventional wisdom that decreases in the formal sector "minimum" wage and increases in the maximum size of firm above which this minimum is enforced will help workers in the informal sector, the essential argument being that these policies may have adverse terms of trade effects on the informal sector that offset their favourable labour market effects.
In other words, of the total profit, Migration flow is then modelled to consist of two distinct streams with two distinct destinations -the manual labourers ( ) migrating to work in the informal sector in response to higher wage in that sector compared to their rural wage, and the rural hirers to the formal sector, with jobs mostly prearranged. (The model allows those of the rural hirers who search for formal sector jobs to do so from either the rural or the urban area.
When search is from the urban area, search cost is borne by the hirers' rural families.
The model also allows those of the hirers who go to the urban area to search for formal sector jobs, but fail to obtain them, to return to the rural area). The migration function for is given by the following expression:
where is the total number of manual labourers ( ). That is, the proportion of who migrate from the rural to the urban area is a function of the difference between the informal sector wage, , and the rural sector wage, , and the greater the difference the greater will be this proportion. There are both psychological and other costs involved in migration, and while some will migrate if is marginally higher than , others, perhaps of less adventurous spirit or more attuned to the rural way of life, would be motivated to migrate only if the difference between and is very much greater.
Potential migrants, in other words, have different levels of inertia in the face of a given difference between and , so that the greater the difference between and the greater will be the proportion of who would actually migrate.
The growth of in the rural area is, of course, given by the natural rate of increase of minus the losses due to rural-urban migration, and can be expressed as:
where m β is the natural rate of increase of . , is higher than their rural income, * v h Π , then there is an incentive for an R H to search for an F-sector job, and the greater the difference between and , the greater will be the proportion of rural hirers who would search for such jobs. The actual number of hirers who would search for F-sector jobs can then be expressed by the following function:
where is the total number of hirers. Now, of course, only a fraction of these hirers who search will in fact secure F-sector jobs since, quite apart from the fact that the number of F-sector jobs available may be less than the number of R H searchers, there will be other H-type candidates -the urban born H-types -who would also be searching for F-sector jobs, and a proportion of the available jobs would go to these other candidates. The share of R H searchers in the total number of H-type candidates would therefore determine the proportion of the available F-sector jobs that would be secured by the R H searchers. The actual number of R H searchers who secure F-sector jobs can then be easily expressed by the following function:
where is the number of workers employed in the formal sector and H is the total number of H-type candidates. f 9 And since the growth of R H is given by the natural rate of increase of R H minus those R H who secure F-sector jobs and move permanently to the urban area, we have
where h β is the natural rate of increase of R H .
Given our migration functions, we can easily write the equation for the growth of labour force in the urban area as follows:
where is the total number of workers in the urban area and L L β is the natural rate of increase of labour in the urban area.
The Model
We have now examined the avenues through which time, t, enters our model and we can easily set out the dynamic version of the model. In the dynamic model set out below, we omit, for the sake of convenience, the subscript t in all variables. (We also exclude equation (1) because of linear dependency).
H, in other words, consists of all the urban-born H -type workers plus all the hirers who are searching for F -sector jobs. A numerical illustration may help clarify our discussion in the text. Suppose that initially there are 100 rural hirers in our economy. Further that, given the difference between and , 20 of them are searching F -sector jobs. (As mentioned in the text, it does not matter whether they are searching from the rural area or from the urban area). Also suppose that in this economy there are 40 urban-born H -type workers. If now, say, 12 jobs become available in the F -sector, then (20/(20+40)). 12, i.e. 4 of the 12 jobs would go to the rural hirers, and these 4 hirers who secure F -
The endogenous variables of the model are:
It will be noted that in this dynamic counterpart of the static model of LDC, time, t, enters in the production functions of the formal and the rural sectors to capture technical progress in these sectors, but as there is no technical progress in the informal sector, t does not enter in the production function of the I M -sector. In the formal sector, t also additionally captures the impact of capital accumulation. And in the rural sector we also let t incorporate the consequences of the fact that as time passes and the number of R H increases, the given land gets subdivided amongst the increased number of hirers. The consumption demand of both the rural hirers and the F -sector employers will also, it will be noted, now depend additionally on t.
Numerical Solution
Setting the Scene
As already mentioned, the behaviour of the static model and the various dependencies therein have been examined in detail in our earlier paper. To examine some of the dynamic aspects of the model, I now specify explicitly the functions appearing in equations (8) In choosing these initial conditions, our aim has been to reflect the situations in a fairly "representative" LDC. sector jobs would then move permanently to the urban area and we will be left with 96 rural hirers in our economy. 10 For fuller justifications of the parameter values and the initial conditions used than provided here and in Appendix 2, the interested reader is referred to the analysis in Bhattacharya (1993b Bhattacharya ( , 1996 Bhattacharya ( , 1998a . Many of the parameter values and initial conditions used here are also within the range of values used in previous simulation studies in the literature.
in the initial period. 11 Second, the formal sector is taken to employ 40 per cent of the urban workers initially. The fact that the informal sector provides employment to a very large number of urban workers is now widely recognised 12 and a share of 40 per cent for formal sector employment would appear to be a reasonable figure to start with. Third, so far as wages are concerned, we take the rural wage, w, to be a quarter and the informal sector wage, v, to be a half of that in the formal sector in the initial period. I have elsewhere provided some evidence on these wages in the Indian context 13 and the initial conditions used here are broadly in accord with this evidence. Gillis et al. (1987, pp. 191-93 ) also provide some observations on the wages in the three sectors as also a discussion of the informal sector in Indonesia. So far as the rural hirer's income, , is concerned, a large number of rural hirers in our economy are likely to be those with holdings of relatively small sizes, h Π 14 and it would seem reasonable to start with a value of lower than the formal sector wage, v*, and accordingly we set the initial value of at 0.6v*.
So far as the evolution of the formal sector wage, v*, is concerned, we shall consider a number of different scenarios. While in the relevant literature, the formal sector wage is commonly viewed as being the "minimum" wage, it can also, of course, be viewed as being either a direct indicator of the union power or the efficiency wage. 15 The formal 11 In other words, we take l m to constitute 60 per cent of the rural population. In determining which agrarian groups correspond to our R H and l m respectively, we recognise that our categories, like most used in social sciences, are not isomorphic. While they have strong empirical content, they are also ideal-typical, i.e., based on global qualitative characteristics. In most less developed countries (LDCs), landless and small holders, the two poorest groups in the rural sector, together constitute a majority of rural households (thus in India, in 1954-55, landless and those with holdings of up to 2.49 acres together accounted for about 56 per cent of agricultural households) and we take these two groups as broadly constituting our l m . Most small holders, of course, supplement their incomes by agricultural labour. 12 See, among others, Sethuraman (1981) and Bhattacharya (1996 Bhattacharya ( , 1998a for evidence on the informal sector employment. 13 See Bhattacharya (1998a) . 14 With holdings of between, say, 3 and 10 acres. See footnote 11 above. Also, and as Little (1982, p. 149) has noted, one of the views of LDC agriculture now widely accepted is that there is an active labour market in the rural areas of LDCs and that all but the smallest operators demand outside labour at times. 15 As is well know, the theoretical foundations of many dual labour market models are provided by the efficiency wage hypothesis, according to which labour productivity depends on the real wage paid by the firm, and employers have the incentive to offer wages in excess of workers' reservation wage. The efficiency wage approach identifies four benefits of higher wage payments: reduced shirking by employees due to a higher cost of job loss; lower turnover; an improvement in the average quality of workforce employed by the firm, and improved morale. [Yellen (1984) , Katz (1986) and Nickell (1990) , provide good reviews of the relevant literature.] Dual labour markets are then explained by the assumption that the wage productivity nexus is important in the primary or formal sector of the economy and there is accordingly in that sector job rationing and voluntary payments by firms of wages in excess of market clearing. By contrast, in the secondary sector, the wage-productivity sector wage can also be influenced by skill-biased technological change, with skillbiased technological change leading to an increase in the wage gap between the formal and informal sectors to reflect the skill differential. While the question of the skillbiased technological change is addressed in Section 4.4 below, we mention this here to make the point that the F-sector wage can be influenced by a number of different factors. Against this backdrop, we, therefore, consider the following five cases to examine the consequences of a change in the formal sector wage, v*, on the evolution of our economy. First, in accord with the view of it being the fixed "minimum" wage, we
shall consider a case where v* is fixed (at 0.8; see Appendix 2). In practice, however, the formal sector wage, v*, is likely to be determined in some relation to the market determined wage in the informal sector, v. So we consider two cases where there are fixed wage differentials between the formal and informal sectors. The cases are: v*=2v
and v*=4v. We then consider a case where we make v* time dependent: v*=2v+0.5.
sin(t/3). Finally, we consider a case where we fluctuate the formal sector wage in time (with periodic oscillations): we set v*=2v for the first ten time periods, 4v for , 6v
for , and 4v for . Consideration of these five different cases will be seen to bring some of the important results of the paper clearly to the fore.
Finally, so far as the natural rates of population growth are concerned, population growth rates in urban areas of developing countries are generally lower than in rural areas and in the simulation we set a natural growth rate of 2 per cent for urban workers, 3 per cent for manual labourers (l m ) and, between these two, a rate of 2.5 per cent for rural hirers.
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The time paths of the endogenous variables would of course be influenced by the parameter values used. While the details of the parameter values and how these are relationship is weak or non-existent and firms in this sector obtain labour at the free market wage. In that variant of the efficiency wage hypothesis known as the shirking model (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Calvo, 1985) , it is assumed that the less observable is workers effort the more likely it is that they will shirk and hence the less productive they will be. By paying wages above the alternative rate, firms provide an incentive to workers not to shirk. A number of dual labour market models are then constructed on the assumption that effort is less observable in the formal than in the informal sector and a higher wage accordingly is paid for jobs in the formal than in the informal sector (in which shirking is difficult). See, for example, Bulow and Summers (1986) and Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989) . See also Dickens and Lang (1988) for empirical foundations of dual labour market theory. Two-sector models can also of course be constructed on a distinction between an unionised and a non-unionised sector. For models along these lines, see Minford (1983) McDonald and Solow (1985) and Layard et al. (1991, ch. 2), among others. 16 Overall rates of population growth in the developing economies ranged from around 2 per cent a year in parts of Africa to over 3 per cent in much of Latin America and in major parts of Asia in the late 1950s and early 1960s. During the 1980s, they ranged from around 3 per cent a year in Africa to around 2 per cent in parts of Asia and Latin America. (Sources: UN Demographic Year Book 1962; and World Bank, World Development Report 1990). incorporated in the simulation are given in Appendix 2, it may once again be useful, before discussing the simulation results, to note here briefly the (proximate) influences on the behaviour of some of the endogenous variables. Thus, the behaviour of the informal sector wage, v, would ceteris paribus be influenced by changes in the labour supply to the informal sector and changes in the demand for both the informal services and the informal manufacturing output. The behaviour of the rural sector wage, w, would be influenced by (i) technical progress in the rural sector, (ii) changes in the number of hirers and of manual labourers in the rural sector, and (iii) changes in the demand for the rural output X by the workers in the urban area. 17 The rural hirer's income, , would be influenced by (i) technical progress in the rural sector, (ii) changes in the number of hirers, and (iii) changes in the price, q, and the wage, w, in the rural sector. 
Different Cases Relating to the Formal Sector Wage and the Simulation Results
The results of the simulation for different cases relating to the formal sector wage, v*, In our model, when the demand for the rural output X increases, the price of X, q, rises when q rises, the rural hirers ceteris paribus demand more labour, and w, the wage in the rural sector, increases as a result. See the discussion in Appendix 2. 18 Lorenz curves have been evaluated at the start of the simulation, at the first point on or after the time period 8, at the maximum of Gini coefficient, at the first point on or after the time period 35 and at the end of the simulation. The points have fractions because of the step size chosen by the solver of the differential equation in Matlab. 19 For readers interested in intra and intersectoral inequalities in a generic form, graphs for logarithmic variances are available on request from the author.
the initial conditions, the number of manual labourers in the rural sector, m, as a fraction of total population, T, decreases in all cases. The number of urban labourers, L, as a proportion of total population, T, on the other hand, increases in all cases. The number of rural hirers, h, as a fraction of total population remains more or less unchanged.
Employment in the formal sector, f, increases absolutely, but as a fraction of urban labour, L, it increases slightly for a brief period of time before declining steadily. 20 The informal sector wage, v, on the other hand, rises steadily over time. The rural sector wage, w, too rises, but rises very slowly and the gap between v and w widens over time.
The income of rural hirers, , also rises but v rises faster than
An intuitive explanation of the behaviour of v in the model can be offered as follows.
An increase in the labour supply in the urban area will of course ceteris paribus tend to decrease the informal sector wage, v. As against this, however, when capital accumulation in the formal sector leads to an increase in employment in that sector, some of the workers in the urban area -some of the urban-born H-type workers -find employment in the formal sector and this tends to decrease the labour supply to the informal sector and so increase v. The demand for informal sector output also increases over time and this too tends to increase v. As investment in the formal sector increases, the demand for the I M -sector output (i.e., the demand for Z input) by the F-sector firms increases. Further, as employment in the formal sector increases due to capital accumulation in that sector, the demand for informal services also increases as a result:
the informal services, it will be recalled, are consumed by F-sector employers and employees, and an increase in the number of F-sector employees, therefore, ceteris paribus, leads to an increase in the demand for such services. (The F-sector employers' demand for such services can also be expected to increase over time, though given their relatively small number, it is unlikely that their increased demand for such services can have a significant impact on v). The net effect of these tendencies is then a steady rise in v. 21 By contrast, changes influencing the behaviour of the rural sector wage, w, in the 20 In absolute terms, the number of manual labourers first rises, then declines in all cases, while the number of rural hirers, total urban labour and employees in the F-sector all increase in all cases. Graphs showing the behaviour of different population segments in absolute terms are not presented here to save space, but are available on request from the author. 21 So far as the effect of an increase in the formal sector wage, v*, on v is concerned, this was found to be ambiguous in the static model. An increase in v*, on the one hand, leads to a decrease in the number of people employed in the formal sector and this tends to decrease the demand for informal services and so tend to decrease v. As against this, however, an increase in v* means that employees in the Fsector , whose wages have increased, will now demand more informal services and this would tend to increase in v. Also, an increase in v* may lead to F-sector employers sub-contracting out more to I M model generate a number of conflicting tendencies (see discussion in Appendix 2) such that w rises only very modestly and the gap between v and w widens over time.
It will be noted that what the particular value of the formal sector wage, v*, is (i.e., whether v*=0.8 or 2v or 4v or time dependent) does not make much of a difference to the evolution of the gap between the informal sector wage, v, and the rural sector wage, w, in the model. The gap between v and w w idens over time (Fig. 2) . Also, the fractional distributions of population are not significantly affected by these changes in v*, with a higher value of v* relative to v leading to a slightly higher level of urbanisation -i.e., the proportion of urban to total labour (L/T) -at the end of the simulation, but not by very much so (Fig. 1) . Even when we fluctuate the formal sector wage in time with periodic oscillations (case 5), this stimuli does not affect significantly either the fractional distributions of population or the wages in other sectors (including the rural hirer's income).
However, changes in the formal sector wage, v*, have major effects on Lorenz curves and the evolution of the Gini coefficient. One can observe that the number of employees in the formal sector, f, as a proportion of urban labour, L, -i.e., f/L -grows for the first 10 -15 time periods of the evolution of the system (Fig. 1) . After this time, this fraction decreases in time in all cases, with varying speed. Therefore, depending on the behaviour of v*, two types of Gini coefficient evolution can be observed:
1. When v* is fixed, the income of the group earning the most in the early stage of the evolution (i.e., the income of F -sector workers) quickly becomes equal with the incomes of other groups, due to the lack of growth of v*; and the Gini coefficient declines over time (Fig. 4) . However, the case of v* being permanently fixed is, of course, an unrealistic one. It is unlikely that v* would remain unchanged as v grows.
Instead, v* will also grow in time.
2. When v* grows, Gini coefficient will increase in the beginning, since the smallest group -the workers in the formal sector, f -earns the most, with their wages also increasing; but in time, the fraction "f" starts to decline and other groups earn more, as the wages and income of other groups also grow in time.
So except when the formal sector wage, v*, is fixed, we do get an inverted U-shaped curve of income distribution. With a higher value of v* relative to the informal sector wage, v, Gini coefficient rises higher, peaks later and ends at a higher value at the end of firms to save on labour costs and this too would tend to increase v. The net effect of an increase in v* on v is therefore not unambiguous and is likely to be relatively small. the simulation. Thus, in the case of v*=2v, Gini coefficient peaks at the time period 14.135 and ends with a value of 0.23 at the end of the simulation; in the case of v*=4v, Gini coefficient peaks at the time period 23.135 and ends with a value of 0.3 at the end of the simulation. In the case where we fluctuate the formal sector wage in time (case 5),
Gini coefficient peaks at the time period 30.635 and ends with a value of 0.3 at the end of the simulation, with the tendency always for the Gini coefficient eventually to decline. Of course, the Gini coefficient need not necessarily decline continuously after reaching a peak; it may decline for a while, then rise again to another peak, higher than the previous peak, due to a renewed widening of the gap between v and v*, but the tendency always is for the inverted U-shaped curve to reassert itself. So the observation of a rise in Gini coefficient after a decline in it will not necessarily imply that there is no underlying inverted U-shaped curve. We shall comment more on this aspect of the inverted-U hypothesis when we come to discuss the skill-biased technological change in Section 4.4 below.
It may also be noted that our results for Lorenz curves and Gini coefficient do not imply that the poorest group of the population (l m ) are necessarily worst off -in terms of their share in total income -at the period when the Gini coefficient is at its peak. Note, however, that it is only in time periods after the period when the Gini coefficient is at its peak that the poorest are relatively worse-off (in terms of their share in total income) compared with the period when the Gini coefficient is at its peak. In earlier periods -periods before the period when Gini coefficient is at its peak -the poorest are relatively better-off (in terms of their share in total income) compared with the period when the Gini coefficient is at its peak. In later periods of the evolution of the economy, income of other groups increase by very much more than that of l m income.
The case for redistribution of income would thus appear to be much stronger at later stages of development than at earlier stages in our model.
Effects of a Change in the Migration Sensitivity Parameters
Having considered the effects of a change in the formal sector wage, v*, we now consider the effects of a change in the responsiveness of potential migrants to ruralurban income differences. A m is the parameter that measures the responsiveness of potential l m migrants -the low skilled workers -to differences between the informal sector wage, v, and their rural sector wage, w (see Appendix 2). In the simulation so far,
we have assumed A m =0.05. We now speed this up and set A m =0.05+0.0008t, while keeping all other parameter values and initial conditions unchanged. And we consider here only the case of v*=2v. Results are presented in Figure 5 . The graphs in Figure 5 are to be compared with those for the case of v*=2v (i.e., case 2) presented in Figures 1-4.
[ Figure 5 here]
Comparing the graphs, one can see that a change in A m has significant effects on the evolution of the rural sector wage, w, the gap between the informal sector wage, v, and the rural sector wage, w, and on the fractional distributions of population. When A m increases, w rises, the gap between v and w becomes smaller, and urban labour as a proportion of total labour -i.e., L/T -increases. A change in the migration sensitivity parameter A m , in other words, has greater effects on the evolution of these variables than does a change in the formal sector wage , v*, which, as we have seen, has relatively little effects on the evolution of these variables.
An increase in A m also leads to Gini coefficient peaking earlier: while in the case of v*=2v and A m =0.05, Gini coefficient peaks at the time period 14.135, in the case of v*=2v and A m =0.05+0.0008t, it peaks at the time period 11.135. Also, in this latter case, the Gini coefficient ends much lower at the end of the simulation. An increase in the responsiveness of l m to differences between their rural and the informal sector wage, in other words, would lead to an improvement in income distribution in this model.
By contrast, a change in the migration sensitivity parameter for the rural hirers, A h , has very little effects on the evolution of our economy. A h is the parameter that measures the responsiveness of rural hirers -the high skilled workers -in looking for F-sector jobs in the face of differences between the formal sector wage, v*, and their rural income, (see Appendix 2). In the simulation of the paper, we have set A h =0. 
Effects of Skill-Biased Technological Change
As noted in the introduction, Aghion and Williamson (1998) have emphasised the role of skill-biased technological change in the observed upsurge of inequality in most OECD countries since the early 1970s. In this view, as a result of skill-biased technological change, there would be a spread of inequality in a high income region. It would clearly be interesting to try to capture some of the effects of skill-biased technological change in our model.
F-sector is the sector which would be subject to skill-biased technological change in the model, with R H migrants and urban-born H-type workers being the skilled workers.
If there is a skill-biased technological change, employment in the F-sector will increase as a result, the skilled workers to be employed in the sector coming from the ranks of the urban-born H-type workers working in the I-sector and from R H migrants.
Subcontracting relationships between the F-sector and the I-sector will probably weaken: more skill intensive F-sector will demand less I M output to be used as input.
Further, the wage gap between the formal and informal sectors will widen to reflect the increased skill differential.
We can change the values of two of the parameters in our model to incorporate these features of skill-biased technological change. We have so far assumed the technical progress in the formal sector to be labour saving. The parameter t γ has captured the contrasting effects of capital accumulation and of the labour saving technical progress in the formal sector on the number of people employed in the formal sector, f (see Appendix 2). In the simulation so far we have set t γ =0.0075. We now change this to t γ =0.0095 to reflect the impact of skill-biased technological change, which, as we just noted, would lead to an increase in employment in the formal sector, f. The other value we change is that of the parameter t ζ . t ζ captures the effects of capital accumulation and technical progress in the formal sector on the demand for I M output by the F-sector firms. We have so far set t ζ =0.0075. We now change this to t ζ =0.005 to reflect the fall in the demand for I M output by the F-sector firms following the skill-biased technological change.
We can now carry out the following simulation to try to capture some of the effects of the skill-biased technological change in the model: we set v*=2v, t γ =0.0075 and t ζ =0.0075 for the first 40 time periods of the simulation, then for the rest of the simulation we set v*=4v, 22 t γ =0.0095 and t ζ =0.005 (i.e., we allow the skill-biased technological change to impinge on our system after 40 time periods). All other parameter values and initial conditions remain unchanged, i.e., are those as set out in Appendix 2. The results of the simulation are presented in Figure 6 . The graphs in Figure 6 are to be compared with those for the case 2 presented in Figures 1-4 (i.e., the case where we set v*=2v, t γ and t ζ =0.0075 all through).
[ Figure 6 here]
The results show that while the number of employees in the formal sector, f, as a proportion of urban labour, L, -i.e., f/L -temporarily rises as a result of skill-biased technological change, the fraction soon begins to decline again, though compared with the case 2, it ends at a higher value at the end of the simulation. Urban labour as a proportion of total labour (L/T), however, ends lower at the end of the simulation in this case compared with the case 2. Skill-biased technological change, in other words, leads to a higher share of F-sector employees in the total urban labour force, but to a lower level of urbanisation.
Rural wage, w, is not significantly affected by skill-biased technological change, but the informal sector wage, v, declines due to the reduction in the demand for I M output by the F-sector firms following the skill-biased technological change. So while employment in the formal sector increases as a result of skill-biased technological change, the wage in the informal sector decreases as a result of such change.
So far as the evolution of the Gini coefficient is concerned, it now peaks at the time period 41. Before the introduction of the skill-biased technological change, Gini coefficient was already on the decline, but the wage premium associated with the increased skill differential now leads to an increase in Gini coefficient, but after this increase, the tendency again is for the Gini coefficient to decline, though, in this case, at the end of the simulation it ends at a higher value than at the start.
Effects of a Change in the Natural Growth Rates of Population
In the simulation so far, we have assumed the natural growth rate of population for manual labourers, m β , to be 0.03; that for rural hirers, h β , to be 0.025; and that for urban labourers, L β , to be 0.02. To examine the consequences of a change in the natural growth rates of population of manual labourers and rural hirers, however, we also carried out a simulation with are not presented here to save space, but are available on request from the author.
Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper has been to address -with the help of numerical simulationsome of the issues relating to income distribution in the context of development of an economy with an informal sector and migration of both low and high skilled workers from the rural to the urban area. In particular, we wanted to see under what conditions we do or do not get an inverted U-shaped curve of income distribution. 22 The gap between v* and v widens to reflect the skill differential. The gap between the informal and the rural sector wage is in general seen to widen over time in our model. 24 Changes in the formal sector wage have relatively little effects on the evolution of this gap or on the proportion of urban to total population in the economy. 25 A change in the responsiveness of potential l m migrants -the low skilled workers -to differences between the informal and their rural sector wage has much greater impact on these. 26 Skill-biased technological change has little effects on the evolution of the rural sector wage, but it leads to a lowering of the informal sector wage.
It also leads to an increase in the share of formal sector workers in total urban workers but to a lower level of urbanisation at the end of the simulation.
We found the tendency always is for the Gini coefficient to rise and then decline.
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However, once it starts declining, it need not continuously decline; it may rise, then decline, then rise again and indeed rise above the previous peak before starting to decline again and may well end at the end of the simulation at a higher value than at the start. How exactly the Gini coefficient moves over time depends crucially on the evolution of the gap between the formal and the informal sector wage. And this gap can, of course, be influenced by a number of different factors such as changes in the forces emphasised in efficiency wage theories, 28 insider power, government policies, trade union pressure, skill-biased technological change, and so on.
So far as the policy implications of the paper are concerned, it is clear that the expansion of the informal sector and migration by manual labourers (l m ) to the informal sector play vital role in reducing income inequality in the model. Policies designed to strengthen sub-contracting relationship between the formal and informal sectors may be particularly important in this context (especially if there is skill-biased technological change tending to weaken this relationship). Also, it is clear that owing to the slow growth of their wage in the rural sector, the manual labourers (l m ) in the rural area will continue to remain poor even at later stages of development. There is, therefore, a case for redistribution of income. However, we found the case for redistribution to be 24 Except in the case of skill-biased technological change (case 7) where, as we saw, following the introduction of skill-biased technological change, the informal sector wage, v, declines due to a reduction in the demand for I M output by the F-sector firms. 25 These results, it will be noted, are very different from those obtained in the Todaro (1969) and Harris-Todaro (1970) -type models. 26 A change in the responsiveness of potential R H migrants -the high skilled workers -to differences between their rural income and the formal sector wage, by contrast, was seen to have very little effects on the evolution of the economy. 27 Except in the case where the formal sector wage, v*, is kept fixed (case 1). But that, as we noted, is an unrealistic case. 28 See footnote 15 on p13 above.
stronger at later stages of development than at earlier stages, even though at later stages, Gini coefficient may be lower than at earlier stages. We also examined the effects of reducing the natural growth rates of population of rural hirers and manual labourers and found that bringing these in line with the natural growth rate of population in the urban area would improve income distribution in the economy.
Finally, while ours has been a simulation exercise, nevertheless the empirical evidence regarding the dynamic nature of the informal sector, the wage gap between the informal and rural sectors, the dual migration streams and the conflicting evidence on the inverted-U hypothesis would all seem to suggest that our analysis very probably does capture some important aspects of income distribution and growth in many developing countries.
Appendix 1. The Labour Market Equilibrium Equations
This appendix provides interpretations of the labour market equilibrium equations of the static model. As mentioned in the text, the full derivation of the static model has been provided in Bhattacharya (1994) . In the model, the price of the F -sector output is taken as the numeraire of the system.
The rural sector
The demand for and the supply of labour in the rural sector is given by
The equation is derived as follows.
(a) We assume that all rural hirers are identical. A rural hirer's production function is given by ).
The equilibrium condition for the rural labour market is then easily written as:
where h = the number of rural hirers, and m = the number of manual labourers.
The urban area
The conditions for labour market equilibrium in the urban area are stated in the form of two equations:
).
The total demand for labour in the urban area consists of (i) the demand for labour in the F-sector, (ii) the demand for labour in the I M segment of the I-sector, and (iii) the demand for labour in the I S segment of the I -sector.
The formal sector
We assume that the number of firms, F, is fixed in the F-sector, that they are all identical, and that each firm has a single owner. The production function of a firm in the F-sector is given by The firms in this sector face a constraint in the form of a "minimum" wage = v*. We assume that there is an abundance of labour for the F-sector, so that the constraint is binding. A profit-maximising firm's problem then is to choose f F and Z F to maximise
where p = the price of the I M -good. The solution to this maximisation problem yields the following demand functions for inputs:
It is assumed that the profit, )
, earned by the firm is distributed between consumption and investment: a fraction ( )
is reinvested within the Fsector, while the remainder is consumed. As a consumer, the problem of the owner of a firm is to maximise his utility function subject to his budget constraint, i.e., to maximise The solution yields the following demand functions for the good he consumes:
The informal sector
The production function of a firm in the I M segment of the I-sector is given by
where l i = amount of labour employed in an I M -firm .
The firms in this sector face a constraint on size: beyond l* they have to pay the "minimum" wage. A firm's problem, then, is to choose l i to maximise , ) (
We assume that the solution of this maximisation problem is l i = l*. This implies that
The alternative for an organiser of an informal firm is a wage salary and we next assume that firms will continue to be set up in the informal sector so long as profit
, where δ may be interpreted as a measure of the entrepreneurial zeal.
This means, in other words, that in equilibrium we will have ). 1 ( * *) (
This of course helps us determine the number of firms in the I M sector in equilibrium.
The supply of I M -output is then given by *) (l Z i i ⋅ , where i is the number of firms in the
The demand for labour in the urban area
We can now easily write the total demand for labour in the urban area;
(i) The demand for labour in the F -sector is given by
The demand for labour in the I M segment of the I-sector is given by:
, where the one is added to account for the owner/manager of an I M firm.
(iii) The demand for labour and the supply of output in the I S segment of the I-sector is given by The equilibrium condition for the urban labour market is then easily written as:
where L is the total labour in the urban area.
Appendix 2. The Simulation Model
A far as is reasonable we choose all functions to be linear functions. The etas, zetas and Ds mentioned below can be related to partial derivative terms of the static model and are expanded in due course. . An increase in v* also leads unambiguously to a decrease in f in the static model. Changes in h and m, however, have no effect on f in the
γ captures the contrasting effects of capital accumulation and of the labour-saving technical progress in the formal sector on f).
The expressions of Ds, zetas and etas mentioned above are as follows:
D t t captures the effects of technical progress in the rural sector on w. (In the static model an increase in L leads to an increase in w. When L (and also f) increases, the demand for the rural output X by the workers in the urban area increases. As a result, the price of X, q, rises and when q rises, the rural hirers demand more labour and w, the wage in the rural sector, increases as a result. The effects on w via these changes, however, are likely to be relatively small and for purposes of simulation we set both D L and D f at 0.0001.
The effects of changes in m and h on w are seen to be ambiguous in the static model. An increase in the number of manual labourers, m, on the one hand, leads to an increase in the supply of labour in the rural sector and so tends to decrease w, but, on the other hand, the consumption of X by manual labours also increases following an increase in their number and this tends to increase q and hence w. On balance, however, the former effect is likely to be stronger than the latter and for the simulation we set D m =-0.1. An increase in the number of rural hirers, h, similarly, leads to an increase in the amount of the rural sector output produced and so tends to decrease q and w, but, on the other hand, an increase in h also leads to an increase in the demand for labour in the rural sector and this tends to increase w. For the simulation we set D h =0.0001. Finally, so far as the effects of technical progress in the rural sector on w are concerned, this technical progress will, on the one hand, tend to increases the amount of the rural sector output X and so tend to decreases q and therefore w; on the other hand, however, due to its labour-using characteristic, this technical progress will also tend to increase the demand for labour in the rural sector and this would tend to increase w. The net effect on w of technical progress in the rural sector is therefore not unambiguous and we set D t = 0.001). 
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